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SUI'4MARY  
To establish whether theoretical and laboratory safety advantages 
of low volatily fuel, such as that of low rate of flame spread, 
are reflected in aircraft accident 'statistics' a preliminary 
study has been made of the ARB's world airline accident summary. 
An advantage has been found in that the change to kerosine has 
apparently halved the death rate in survivable accidents. 
In all gas turbine accidents, including those where death was 
probably due to impact not fire, the death rate seems to be 50% 
hiEher with wide cut gasoline than with kerosine. 
It has also been found that a higher proportion of gasoline 
powered aiperaft accidents involved impact death 1.1-1d that overall 
the survival rate has remained virtuaaly unchanged. A critical 
examination of these preliminary findings, in the light of the 
relevant accident reports, is planned. 
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11'.:TRODUCTION  
The properties of aviation fuels are well documented and it 
can he readily appreciated that a large difference in, 
example, the rate of flame spread across spilled fuel and the 
uresence or not of an explosive mixture in the tanks must Ilave 
some effect on accident survival. However the extent to 
different fuels have been used has not been widely known ane 
the quantitative effect of these on survival has rarely been 
considered. 
This study has been started as a result of the present fuT 
shortage, the initial aims being to establish the benefit that 
has already accrued from the change from gasoline to kerosine 
and the extent to which this would be lost if a change were 
now made to wide cut gasoline. Further aims are to see what 
additional benefits might be expected from the adoption of an 
anti-misting kerosine and what might be lost if the recently 
proposed lower flash point kerosine were adopted. However 
these are outside the scope of the preliminary study. 
So far the only reference used, apart from a few reports already 
held, has been reference 1 the ARB World Airline Accident 
Summary complete up to Supplement 20 of January 1974 which 
gives a preliminary listing of last year's accidents. 
L. CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS  
As the prime interest is the influence of fuel type on the fire 
risk the classification has grown from the two standpoints of 
fuel type and the presence or not of fire. Of the three fuel 
types in use, gasoline, kerosine and wide cut gasoline a clear 
distinction exists between gasoline and the other two according 
to the type of engine. That between kerosine and wide cut is 
less clear. In fact it can probably never be established with 
any certainty because very few accident reports make proper 
reference to the fuel despite clear instructions so to do in 
the ICAO Manual of aircraft accident investigations. However 
this does not pose too much difficulty because the fuel policies 
of most airlines are reasonsably well known. Furthermore the 
principle distinction to be made is between a fuel above and 
below its flash point and as it takes only a comparatively 
small proportion of wide cut to reduce the flash point of a 
mixture to below common ambient tmeperatures it is reasonable 
to assume that the tanks of any wide cut user will contain a 
potentially more hazardous fuel even if the last refuelling or 
two have been with kerosine. In any case such an assumption 
would diminish rather than exaggerate the die.:' 2nces, no bad 
thing in a preliminary study! 
rile known and assumed users of wide cut fuel are or have been 
the following: 
TCA, now Air Canada 	 throughout the period 
TWA 	 until January 1965 
Fan Am 
	 until January 1965 
JAL 	 until October 1970 
Canadian Pacific 	 sometimes 
Sabena 	 sometimes 
KLM 	 until 1969? 
All Nippon 	 assumed same as JAL 
American domestic and other airlines engaged in 
military transport flights and other flights from 
military bases, also flights out of Taipei and Seoul 
where no kerosine is available. 
It should be noted that most airlines not only specify kerosine 
as their usual fuel but also take special precautions should 
they have to uplift wide cut fuel in an emergency, they are 
also quite open about their policy. Some wide cut users however 
have been less than open and it has not always been possible 
to confirm their policy at any given time, thus a detailed 
study of actual accident reports is still required. 
Russian aircraft have generally been ignored, for two reasons. 
First because nearly all are operated by Eastern bloc countries who 
do not necessarily notify the West of their accidents. Thus 
while there are still a reasonable number of accidents listed 
it is probable that they do not form a representative sample, 
the more dramatic accidents are likely to overwhelm the many 
important minor accidents where no one was hurt. This is 
probably the principle reason why those listed suggest a record 
worse than either gasoline or wide cut fuelled Western aircraft. 
The second reason is that many of the Russian jets and turboprops 
may be fuelled with kerosine to Russian specifications. These 
have allowable flash points considerably lower than that of 
even British kerosine and it is possible that in some cases 
this could be a further complicating factor. The only such 
accident where the actual fuel is known to the author is that 
to a TU 154 at Rijeka in 1971 hence its inclusion in the tables. 
In this case the aircraft was refuellled at Gatwick with kerosine 
(DERD 2494) having been previously fuelled in Yugoslavia with 
wide cut (Jet B). It has been estimated that approximately 10% 
of the fuel onboard at the time of the accident was wide cut. 
Having classified as best one can according to fuel type each 
of these three groups has been divided initially into four sub 
group3. 
(1.) 
	
fire in survivable or probably survivable accidents 
(ii) no fire or no fire mentioned in survivable accidents 
(iii) deaths almost certainly by impact 
(iv) deaths probably by impact (no survivors) 
at this stage sub groups (iii) and (iv) have been presented 
toether as 'probably impact' and these may be compared 
particularly with the 'probably survivable' and 'total' for 
each fuel type. 
Table 1 shows for each year and group the total number of 
(ie passengers and crew but excluding any on the ground) 
killed, followed by the total number at risk, that is the total 
number aboard. Note that although the basic period covered is 
1966 to 1973 inclusive the accidents that involved or may have 
involved wide cut have been supplemented from the three previous 
years to increase the sample size. This earlier period before 
Pan Am and TWA abandoned wide cut includes the two classic 
wide cut accidents, at Elkton and at Rome but despite these 
the fatality rates are all slightly decreased as a result of 
increasing the sample in this way. 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Before discussing this table it is worth noting that the kerosine 
sample is so large compared to the wide cut sample that any 
incorrect classifications can make little difference to the 
overall kerosine figures. On the other hand one or two 'assumed 
wide cuts' that turn out to be kerosine could have a considerable 
effect on the wide cut figures but might either raise or lower 
them. Table 2 therefore lists all of the 'wide cut' accidents 
used in this preliminary classification. 
Returning to Table 1 several clear patterns imerge that are 
remarkably consistant from year to year. 
In all accidents the fatality rate (as a percentage of those 
at risk) with gasoline (39.0) is almost twice as high as with 
kerosine (21.1). 
In survivable accidents a similar ratio is evident (18.8 to 10.0) 
and again in those accidents known to have involved fire (39.2 
to 18.9). 
Wide eut appears to be similar to gasoline, as one would expect. 
in terms of survivable accidents (22.7 to 18.8) and in those 
known to have involved fire (46.2 to 39.2), however overall it 
lies in between gasoline and kerosine (31.8 as against 39.0 and 
21.1). This difference appears to be explained by a different 
pattern of accidents as between piston engines aircraft and 
the rest. 
Whereas with gasoline (in pistons) 24.9% of all those at risk 
die in accidents probably as a result of impact the figures 
for kerosine and wide cut are 12.5% and 11.8% or, combining 
the latter two for all gas turbines, 12.4%. 
Eaen ef tneae patterne exeeptinv; the e!Jell wide cut eample in 
mere er [Lae repeated in each individual year giving eoneiderable 
eenfidence to the obvious conclueione. In particular the 
improvement from piston engined to gas turbine engined aireraft 
appear to be due to two main factors, a higher proportion of 
accidents are survivable and the chances of continued survival 
are then higher mainly due to reduced fire risk when using 
kerosine. With wide cut this second improvement is missing. 
Both the similarities and the differences are predictable, 
qualitatively, but only such an analysis of the accidents 
involving each fuel can quantitatively assess the different 
survival rates. Of great interest arethe overall fata:!eity rates 
of wide cut and kerosine, 31.8% to 21.1% , a ratio of 1.51. 
That is if wide cut became the standard fuel one might expect 
fatalities to increase by 51%. 
Lest it be thought that the large proportion of only 'assumed' 
wide cuts is unduly influencing this result it should be noted 
that in the six confirmed wide cut accidents 3;.6% of those 
at risk died. If the remainder are now assumed to be kerosine 
then the kerosine fatality rate is increased ',c) 21.6% and 
the ratio becomes 2.11 an increase in fatalities of 111, 
One may also expect qualitatively, that wide cut would be worse 
than gasoline because although flame spread rates are similar 
wide cat also carries with it the additional risk of almost 
immediate fuel tank explosion, as demonstrated at Elkton. and 
at Rome. However while the figures do tend to confirm that the 
fire risk is higher than for gasoline the difference shown so 
far is not very large and it remains to be seen whether this 
figure remain• unchanged whee more accident reports are studied. 
The only two other studies of survival rates referred to at 
this stage are the CAB's. of 1965 (ref.2) and the Air Safety 
Group's of 1966 (ref.3). The former deals only with American 
operators and doesn't distinguish between fuel types at all, 
yet during the period considered. 1955 to 19b4 ,the majority were 
gasoline (plus the two classic wide cut accidents) so it le 
interesting to note that the overall fatality rate was 1!155 from 
a total of 4559, that is 42.9% , a figure not far removed from 
that of gasoline in this study. The Air Safety Group used this 
same report together with reference 4 and others and concluded 
that the fire risk was roughly halved in changing from gasoline 
to kerosine, a conclusion that the present study's much larger 
sample tends to confirm. 
liowever in acceptiw that the indteaten correlations between 
aircraft type and between fuel type mean what they appear to 
mean and. are riot just a coincidence one has to look also at the 
other' eurvivable accidents, those where there was either no 
fire or fire was not mentioned in the summary. J2able 1 shows 
considerable differencenbetween fuel types both in the number 
of people at risk and the percentage killed, this must be 
explained. In the 45 accidents of Table 2, assumed to have 
involved wide cut there are only about two where any real doubt 
exiote about the prenence of fire. Even with theca two it is 
reasonably certain that there was no fire so in this category 
`other' means 'no fire'. Thus 47% of those involved in 
survivable accidents were also subjected to a real fire risk. 
On the other hand kerosine and gasoline both show far more 
in the no known fire column yet the fatality rate in each 
also mueh higher. A brief look at the summaries will confirm 
that there are far more accidents where there might well have; 
been a fire but none is mentioned, to the extent that one 
suspects that with gasoline a fire was considered normal aao 
therefore was omitted from the summary. While an alternetioe 
to the assumption that there are many unreported gasoline 
is that piston engined aircraft passengers are far more ;:t!b: 
to impact deaths in accidents with no fire it should be noteO 
that use of the proportion derived from the wide cut results 
does predict a figure close to the actual. 
Putting R = number at risk, S = proportion of survivable aecn_zent; 
and F = proportion who die in accidents known to have involved 
fire, one can obtain D the total number of deaths from the 
expression 	
D = R 	 + S(0.47 F - 0.99* 
So by using the average value for S of 0.876 we obtain for wieo 
cut gasoline 	
D = 2716 <!1 + 0.876(0.47 0.462 - 0.99)1( 
= 878 	 1.k high 
for kenosine 
Dk 	 33313 ri + 0.76(0.47 0.189 - 0.99) 
7015 0.)70 low 
and for gasoline with S = 0.751 
Ds - 6008{1 + 0.751(0.47 0.592 - 0.99 
2372 1.1; high 
Alternatively one can use the average ealue of F for gasoline 
and wide cut, 0.431, this gives Dg 4.7% nigh and Dw 2.6% low, 
not so good but a reasonable approximation. rf course such 
results may be quite coincidental but such 	 agreement for 
kerosine and gasoline suggests that there may be something in 
this approach. 
While with wide cut the actual aecident fIgunen show t;Lat 00% 
of all deaths are In accidents invelvIag 	 Jn appro4(.11 
predict„ that the correnpondluv propoetions fon gasoline eod 
k(.ronine are about 3!)% and 3y% , rather hIgher than uxpeetkl 
and of yet unconfirmed. Not all deaths in accidents involving 
fire are actually as a result of fire but these figures do 
emphasise the importance of reducing fire risk. The gasoline 
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of course lower because a smaller percentage survive 
in tnc first place, thus as the number of survivors increases 
so doer, the importance of decreasing the fire risk. 
CONCLUSIONS  
4.1 During the period considered the overall survival rate 
in all 1i. stec accidents has remained virtually constant 
at about 75.6% of those at risk in tl-ise accidents. 
A possible slight improvement due to the continued 
phasing out of gasoline fuelled aircraft is offset by 
several losses due to bombs with 1972 being a particularly 
bad year. 
4.2 The change from piston engines to gas turbines has 
approximately halved the death rate. This is partly due 
to an increase in the proportion of survivable accidents 
from 75.1% to 87.6% . 
	
4.3 	 It is possible that fire occurs in 47% of all survivable 
accidents, however this figure may be modified by study 
of the full accident reports. 
	
4.4 	 In accidents where fire definitily occurred (ie it is 
mentioned in the summary or is otherwise known) the death 
rate is more than twice as high with the volatile fuels 
(43.1 % ) as with kerosine (18.9 % ). 
4.5 The death rate in all survivable accidents is twice as 
high with the volatile fuels (20.2 % ) as with kerosine 
(10.0 % ). 
4.6 The overall death rate in gas turbine engined aircraft 
is approximately half as high again with wide cut gasoline 
(31.6% ) as with kerosine 21.1 %). In piston engined 
aircraft it is even higher (39.6 % ) because of the 
extra 'impact' deaths. 
4.7 Should wide cut be used as standard a reduction in deaths 
of one third could be achieved by a change to kerosine 
(ie by raising the fuel flash point to above operational 
fuel and ambient temperatures). It is considered unlikely 
that such an improvement could be achieved as easily and 
as cheaply in any other way. 
Supersonic transports are often likely to land with fuel 
above flash point so a compensating improvement must be 
found if present safety levels are to 	 maintained. 
	
4.9 	 Despite recommendations in the ICAO 'Manual of Aircraft 
Accident Investigation' details of the fuel type(s) and 
distribution within the aircraft are often omitted. 
This shortcoming should be remedied. 
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